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Faith, T.P. Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Sequential Capacity Choice
This paper examines the outcome of a simultaneous price setting duopoly in which firms first
choose capacity sequentially. Firms incur an identical unit cost of capacity, but may have different
unit costs of production up to capacity. Outcomes similar to several other-incumbency models are
found as specia] cases of the 3-stage model and tied to the underlying costs. If capacity is
inexperuive one of three outcomes is found, depending on the costs of production; judo (Gelman
and Salop, 1983), cost-precommitment (Dixit, 1980) or reverse judo. If capacity is expensive the
outcome of the 3-stage model coincides with the Stackelberg outcome. Allowing firms to
strategically set prices instead of requiring identical, market clearing prices to be set (i.e. the
Cournot assumption) resu~ts in a mixed strategy, pricing equilibrium in the the last stage of
competition when the capacities are of the judo type. On average, firms choose capacities greater
than thier expected sales in equilibrium in these situations. In all other cost regions pure strategy,
capacity clearing prices are observed.
JEL code: L13I
1. INTRODUCTION
Many theorists, starting with Bertrand (1883), have criticized quantity setting models because
of their reliance on a hypothetical auctioneer who sets price in order to clear quantities off the
market. Casual observation yields that firms set both prices and quantities. For most mazkets, a
strong intuitive argument can be made in favor of industry behavior which incorporates quantity
setting followed by price decisions. Edgeworth (1925) first noted that limitation of the quantity
which price setting rivals can sell eliminates one implausible aspect of the Bertrand model -that a
two-firm industry is identical in its outcome to that of a perfectly competitive industry. When
quantities are chosen first it is useful to interpret them as capacities which limit sales in a later stage
of competition in prices. Shapiro (1989), in his survey of oligopoly theory, supports this separation
of quantities and prices into a two-stage decision process when he writes, "...capital is a relatively
sluggish variable, whzreas prices can be adjusted quickly."
Recently, some striking similarities have been found between capacity-constrained pricing
models and Cournot's model. When firms first choose capacities simultaneously and then
simultaneously choose price, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) find that, with the assumption of
efficient rationing and identical unit costs of production up to capacity, the outcome is identica] to
that of Cournot. In Deneckere and Kovenock's (1989) extension of this model to different unit
costs, this same equivalence result occurs if the unit production cost difference is not too large or
if the unit cost of capacity ís high enough.' The establishment of links between simultaneaus
capacity choice models and the simultaneous quantity setting model of Cournot leads one to ask what
the analogous capacity setting model would be for the sequential quantity setting model of
Stackelberg (1934). This paper examines the subgame perfect outcome of a model of sequential
capacity choice followed by simultaneous price setting and compares it to that of the Stackelberg
model .2
Although the 3-stage framework examined in this paper is the same as Allen's (1986), the
assumptions on costs differ from hers in two important ways. First, this paper examines firms'
capacity decisions in the absence of fixed costs to focus on the strategic aspect of an incumbent's
capacity decision in anticipation of entry taking place. Second, asymmetry in the tirms' unit eosts
of production is allowed.
The sequential capacity setting Bertrand-Edgeworth model provides a unification of several
models of incumbency. Depending on the production and capacity costs one can obtain: judo
equilibria (Gelman and Salop (1983)), Dixit (1980) type outcomes or Stackelberg type outcomes.
A fourth type of equilibrium is found where the incumbent sets capacity to induce less aggressive
final stage pricing by the entrant. These types of outcomes are referred to as "reverse judo"
equilihria, since they involve the incumbent's anticipation of competing with a stronger (i.e. lower
cost) rival rather than the entrant's. Finally, Stackelberg type equilibria are shown to require a
positive cost of capacity. Generally speaking, the Stackelberg outcome cannot be obtaine~i from the
3-stage model with costless capacity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2, presents the basic model.
The equilibrium of the pricing subgame are given in Section 3. In Section 4 the entranr's capacity
best-response function is derived. Section 5 analyzes the equilibrium outcome with a negligible cost
of capacity. In Section 6 the assumption of negligible cost of capacity is relaxed to allow a positive,
unit cost of capacity which is identical across firms. Section 7 concludes and suggests applications.
2. THE 1110DEL
Consider a market with two sellers of a homogeneous product. Each firm can produce this
good at a constant, but not necessarily identical cost per unit output c;ZO, i-1,2, up to some level3
of capacity k; z0, above which production is infinitely costly. Firms also incur an identical, unit
cost of capacity, r?0. The duopolisu face a linear aggregate demand,
Q(p)-max{0,1-p}, (1)
where the slope and intercept are set equal to one in order to reduce the number of parameters in
the calculations which follow. P(q) denotes the associated inverse demand. Costs and demand are
common knowledge.
Competition between the firms takes the form of a 3-stage game. In the first stage one firm
(the incumbent) chooses its capacity level. In the second stage the other firm (the entrant) chooses
its capacity after ohserving the incumbent's capacity choice. In the final stage firms simultaneously
choose prices p, z c; i-1,2. Capacity costs are assumed to be incurred in the firm's capacity setting
stage and are taken as sunk in the later pricing stage. The game is solved by backward induction
to find the subgame perfect equilibrium.
To limit the analysis to non-trivial cases, only costs for which neither firm has a drastic cost
advantage will be examined, c~ ~(1 t c;-r)l2, i~j. If the inequality is reversed, firm j's total unit
cost (production plus capacity) is above the price that firm i charges as a monopolist. Firm i then
se~s its capacity at the monopoly level for costs c;tr, while firm j is blockaded from entry. For
notational purposes, tirm 1 is assumed to have a cost advantage (if one exists) over firm 2, that is
c~ 5 c~.
Before the characterization of the model is complete the manner in which consumers are
rationed must be described. When price-setting firms are capacity constrained the lower priced firm
may not have sufficient capacity to sell to everyone who desires the product at the lower price. In
these situations there is some residual demand for the higher priced firm's output. The way in
which customers are rationed affects the pricing strategies, and thus firms' payoffs. The rationing4
rule which is adupted here is one which maximizes social surplus, frequently referred to as efficient
rationing. If firm i is the higher priced firm (or the higher cost firm in the case of equal prices) it
sells to the residual demand:
d;(p,)- max {0, Q(p;)-k:} . (2)
Finalfy, if both firms have identical unit costs of production and set the same price, customers will
arbitrarily be allocated to firm 1 first. This last tie-breaking assumption is made purely for
notational convenience and does not affect the outcome of the game. Given this rationing rule, the
firms' subgame profiu are given by:
L;(P~) ~ (p;-c;)min~k~,Q(P;)] P;cP; ~





To facilitate comparisons between the 3-stage model and quantity setting models it will be
helpful to refer to the levels of capacity and price that correspond to certain well-known constructs
in the quantity setting model, such as the Cournot quantity levels, the Stackelberg quantity levels
and the firms' quantity best-response functions. Replacing the final, simultaneous pricing stage of
the 3-stage model with the ad hoc assumption that identical prices are set makes this model identical
to the Stakelberg's. Using this assumption, if firm j puts capacity y on the market, then firm i's
"Cournot" best-response function (in capacity) is R`(y)-maz{0,(1-y-c;-r)l2}. The Cournot best-
response which includes only the production cost (unit cost of capacity set to zero) is denoted by
R~"(y). The intersection of the Cournot best-response functions defines the Cournot capacity levels5
k~-(1-2c;fc~-r)~3, i-1,2, i~j. In sequential choice of capacity the incumbent sets
k;-(1-2c,fcÉ r)l2, while the entrant sets kÉ-max{0,(1-3cEf2c~r)l4}. The Cournot price, where
both firms' capacities are cleared from the market, is denoted as p`-1-k;kE. Subscripts will be
dropped in situatiun where it is apparent which firm is being discussed. Throughout the remainder
of this paper the subscript j will be used to mean "not i."
3. THE PRICING S[,BGAME
The pricing subgame comprises firms' simultaneous choice of distributions over prices given
the unit costs of production and capacities. The unit costs of capacity have already been sunk at this
point and have no intluence on the subgame profits other than their earlier intluence on the capacity
choices which are treated as exogenous in the final stage. Applying the existence theorum of
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) for games with discontinuous payoffs, Deneckere and Kovenock (1989)
establish the existence of an equilibrium of this subgame and provide the Nash solution with the
more general demand assumption of concave revenue. This section provides a brief derivation of
suhgame protits along Deneckere and Kovenock's arguments to facilitate the analysis in later
sections.
Taking costs and capacities as parameters, firms choose (possibly degenerate) distributions,
~;(p), i-1,2, over prices. Firms are assumed to be risk neutral and, therefore, to maximize expected
protits. A Nash Equilibrium of this subgame is detined as a pair ofdistríbutions, (~;{p),~;(p)), such
that A;(~;(p),~,(p)) zF,(~;(p),~~(p)), i-1,2. The upper and lower bounds of the support of firm i's
equilibrium distribution are denoted p; and p;, white a; represents firm i's equilibrium expected
subgame profit.
ln deriving the equilibrium expected profits, first consider that firm i can "guarantee" itself6
a profit level of H; : max H;(p), firm i's minimax profit, by charging p". inf{p; p-argmax H;(p)}.-
With the above cost and demand assumptions:
p`,'-max{c,.l-I~-k~,(1-k~tc,)l2}.
The equilibrium profit of at least one firm can already be pinned down using the definitions of p"
and p;.
Proposition 1: If p,-p., then p,-p;' and firm 2 earns HZ in equilibrium. If p;~p~ firm i earns
H;(p;) in equilibrium and p,-p!!.
Proof: The first part of Proposition 1 follows immediately from the assumption that firm 2 earns
H,(p) when prices are tied. Whenever firm 2 sets p. it earns H,(p~ with certainty. By definition
p," maximizes H,(p). Therefore, it must be the case that p,-p." and a;-H2, because all prices in
the suppport of ~'.(p) must yield firm i the same expected profit in equilibrium. Using similar
arguments; p; must equal p," and a; -H; when p; ~ p~. t]
Derivation of the equilibrium price distributions is straightforward, hut complicated by
phenomena such as potential asymmetry of the upper bounds of the supports of the distrihutions and
the existence of gaps and mass points. All that is required for the purpose of deriving the entrant's
capacity best-response function and the firms' equilibrium capacities is the (much simpler)
specification of firms' equilibrium expected subgame profits in terms of the costs and capacities.
Equilibrium profits are provided by following proposition.
Proposition 2: a;-L;(,~, where ~-max{~„~.}, ~,..inf{p;L,(p)-H;}, i-1,2.7
Proof: It is easily shown that p; 5 argmax L;(p). Concavity implies that L;(p) is increasing in price
over the range of prices within the equilibrium support of firm i's distribution. It follows that p;
cannot be below ~,. Prices below ~, are payoff dominated by setting p,". From the fact that L~{p)
is also increasing in price in this range, it is obvious that neither firm charges less than ~-max{~;,s~}
in equilibrium. Further, asymmetric lower bounds of the supports can be ruled out. If pi. ~ Q; firm
i could increase iu profit by charging any price between Q; and p~;, violating the notion of a Nash
Equilibrium. Restricting attention to a common lower bound of the equilibrium supports, it clearly
cannot be set above ~. If both firms set their lower bound at p,~~, it would be necessary for both
tirms to earn profit greater than their minimax profit, violating Proposition 1. Therefore, it must
be true that p,-R,-~. Given that firms' expected profit must be the same at every price in the
support of their equilibrium distributions, it must be that case that F'-L;(~), i-1,2.0
Finally, a qualitative separation of equilibria into pure and non-degenerate mixed strategy
forms will be usefull for understanding the links between quantity setting models and the 3-stage
model. Three distinct types of outcomes are identified in the following proposition on the basis of
the relation between s and the higher of c. and P(k,fkJ. Existence of an equilibrium is taken as
given by the fact that the cost and demand assumptions of the model fulfill the requirements of
Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986) theorem (Deneckere and Kovenock (1989)).
Proposition .~: If k; 5 R~o(k;), i-1,2, or if k, z Q(c,) and Q(c;,~(c,-c,) z H;, then the equilibrium is
in pure strategies at p;-P(k,tk.) or p;-c,, respectively. C~therwise the equilibrium is in non-
degenerate mixed strategies.
Proof: From Propositions 1 and 2 it clearly follows that a necessary condition for the existence of
pure strategies equilibria is ~-p"- max{c,,P(k, t k~}. If k; 5 R~"(k;), i-1,2, then p"-p"-P(k, fk,).8
Since all prices below P(k, t k~ are strictly dominated by setting P(k, f k~, it follows from
Propositions 1 and 2 that the capacity clearing price must be the pure strategy equilibrium in this
range of capacities.
lf ~ 1 P(k, f k~ at least one firm's capacity is left partially or fully idle after the realization
of sales. If k, Z Q(c`), then H,(p)-0 and ~-p?-cz. If, in addition, H; 5 Q(c~(c1-c,), then ~, 5 c.
and (Proposition 2) firms must earn profit L;(c~, i-1,2. The pure strategy prices which obtain these
profits equal the higher of the two unit costs of production, the standard Bertrand outcome.'
For all other capacity pairs ~~max{c,, P(k,fk~}. ~~P(k,tk~ implies that at least one
firm's capacity will go partially or fully unsold after sales have been realized. Yet, ~1c, implies
that both firms earn positive expected profit in equilibrium. Given that an equilibrium exists, it
cannot be in pure strategies. If firm 1 were mass any probability above max{c2, P(k,fk~}, firm
2 would never wish to place mass at the same price. The equilibrium must, therefore, be in non-
degenerate mixed strategies. ~
Pure strategy equilibria exist when both capacities are relatively small or when both are
relatively Farge. If both capacities are less than or equal to the firm's production-cost-0nly Cournot
best-response, k; 5 R;"(k~), the equilibrium price is the same as that achieved by Cournot's auctioneer
which clears all capacity from the market, p; -P(k, f k~, i-1,2. Large capacities tend to enhancing
price competition. The larger one's rival's capacity is, the smaller is the residual demand a firm
faces and, thus, the lower is the firm's minimax price. Pure strategy equilibria also occur when
both firms' capacities are so large that both firms' minimax prices are driven down to (or below)
the less efficient firm's unit cost of production. As in the classical Bertrand model, firms set p;-c.,
i-1,2. The lower cost firm sells Q(a~- I-c;, while the higher cost firm sells nothing. Outside of
these two regions of capacity pairs the equilibria are in non-degenerate mixed strategies.9
4. BERTRAND-EDGEWORTH BEST-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
Given the (expected) payoffs which result in the final stage, the enfrant's capacity choice is
made conditional on not only the incumbent's capacity and the respective unit costs of production,
but the unit cost of capacity as well. Firm i maximizes profit II;(iS.,k~). x;-k;r, in its capacity setting
stage. The entrant's best-response is defined, in general, as R(k,). argmax L~-rkE, where (k,,k~)-
EK. {(k„kE); k,ZO, i-1,2}. However, a derivation of the explicit reaction function is useful for




Figure 1: Division of the capaciry space between regions that obtain pure (shaded areas) and
mixed (non-shaded areas) equilibrium pricing strategies in the subgame.
Because a; is not differentiable at every point it is easiest to split the analysis into several
capacity regions and then compare constrained maxima to find the entrant's capacity be.st-response10
for any given capacity of the incumbent. According to Proposition 3, capacity pairs can be divided
into three mutually exclusive subsets. First, the subsets of capacity pairs which result in pure
strategy equilibria in the pricing subgame are defined as K`. {(k„kE); k; SR`"(k;), i-1,2} and
K".{(k,,kE);k,ZQ(~.~ and Q(a)(c~-c,)zH;}. Second, KM.K`(K`UKB) is defined as the set of
capacity pairs which result in mixed strategy pricing equilibria only. These three regions are shown
for the case of unit costs of production c,-0 and cE-0.1 in Figure l.
. The entrant's constrained best-responses within K` and KB are rather easily obtained.
Capacity pairs in K` result in the capacity clearing price. Within this subset of K, the Bertrand-
Edgeworth capacity response is equivalent to a Cournot quantity response. The Cournot capacity
level, RÉ(k,)-(1-k,-cÈr)l2, (k„kE)EK`, maximizes the entrant's profit. If (k„kE)EKB, firms'
subgame profits are identical to the standard Bertrand profits. Although a~ is independent of either
capacity in Ke, IIE is reduced by r for every additional unit of capacity. Thus, RB(k,).min{k~
;(k,,kE)E KB} maximizes the entrant's profit by minimizing the entrant's capacity.
Finding the constrained best-response in KM is slightly more involved. Define two subsets
of K": K"'. {(k,,kE); (k,,kE)E K", ~,-z~~, i~j}, i-1,2. Proposition 2 states that firm i's subgame
profit within K"' is L;(s;)-H;(p;'), which is independent of firm i's capacity. Again, given that
capacity is costly in the full game profit, the entrant's constrained best-response minimizes its
capacity, R~(k,). inf(kE; (k,,kE)E K~}. R"E(k,) lays on the boundary between K~ and either K`
or K'"~ (depending on whether k,5k; or not) and the fact that II~{kE,k,) is concave in own capacity
in both K` and K"" for all kECR~(k,) implies that R"'E(k,) is (weakly) dominated by either RÉ(k,)
or Rw(k,). Thus, R"E(k,) is ruled out as the unconstrained maximum.
Lastly, R~(k,) needs to be defined. However, the entrant's subgame profit, LE(~,), is not
quasi-concave in the kE in K~ as it is in the other subsets. LE{~,) is a cubic in region K~, concave
for smaller values of kE and convex for greater values of kE. The convex portion of K~ is ruled
out by noting that all values of kE in this region must be (weakly) dominated by responses in either11
the lower concave portion of K"'~ and~or the upper boundary of K~, which is also the lower
boundary of KB, or RB(k,).' For notational convenience, the local maximum of the concave portion
of K"` will be taken to represent the best-response for the entire mixed strategy region of capacities.
Since the other regions of KM is (weakly) dominated, this should pose no problem for the
construction of the unconstrained best-response function. The local maximum of the concave region
of K"' is the maximium of zero and:'
RM(k~) ~
(2(1-c~)- (1-c,)'-12k~(c~-cE-r) )l3 if k~sk,',
~E
s
The entrant's profit and, therefore, best-response is independent of the incumbent's capacity above
a certain critical level. This is because ~(which equals p, in K~, by detinition) is independent of
k, for values of k, greater than y,(kE,c,)i[1-c,f kE(2(1 -~~)-kE) ~~2. Then, the entrant's subgame
profit, LE(~s), must also be independent of k, in this range of capacities.` Second, RM(k,) is
discontinuous at k',. The capacities (k;,~f) are simply determined by the isoprotit contour which is
just tangent to ,~, (see Figure 2).'
The major di' tference between the Stakelberg quantity setting model and the 3-stage
Bertrand-Edgeworth model is that, in the 3-stage model, commitment of capacity does not imply an
automatic commitment to drive down price to the capacity clearing level, imposing capacity clearing
assumes an extreme form of competition in which prices may be set below Nash levels. Nowhere
is this more apparent than in the capacity region KB, where the less efficient firm's capacity is left
entirely idle. Cournot type capacity clearing would necessitate pricing below marginal cost in KB.
k~ z k,'.12
In K" prices are randomized in equilibrium; sales fall stochastically below a firm's capaciry. Capa-
city-constrained price-setting outcomes (weakly) dominate those of Cournot's auctioneer. It is
obvious that Cournot's price setting assumption diminishes the value of capacity, leading to lower
capacity responses than those in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model.
kE
Figure 2: Entrant's isoprofit curves in capacity space.
Using R`~(k,), R"(k,) and RB(k,) the Bertrand-Edgeworth best-response function can be
constructed. First, note that together R`(k,) and R"(k,) form a continuous function at the boundary
between regions K` and KM. Denote the point where they meet (ko,kÉ). Second, a less efficient
entrant would never wish to enter KB. Clearly, the function formed by K~ and KM is the best-
response for unit production costs cE2c,. A response of RB(k,) by a less efficient entrant yields no
revenue to the entrant while requiring payment of capacity costs. If the entrant is more efficient the13
best-response can be viewed as a choice between accomodating, R`(k,) and RM(k,), or undercutting,
RB(k,), the leader in the final pricing stage. Three types of response functions can be identified on
the basis of whether and where the entrant finds an accomodating response preferable to undercutting
responses. In the first type, the entrant's best-response is R`(k,) if k, 5 ko, RM(k,) otherwise. (n the
second type, the best-response function corresponds to R`(k,) if k,5 kD, and then for a range of
k,E (ko,k;'] is equal to RM(k,), after which the best-response function jumps upward to RB(k,),
k,zk;. [n the third type, the best-response jumps up to RB(k,) from R`(k,) at k;'Sko. Ezamples
of these three types of best-response functions are presented in Figure 3.
As a last point concerning the difference between Bertrand-Edgeworth capacity competition
and Cournot competition, it is more di~cult to clissify capacities as strategic substitutes or
compliments (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer ( 1985)) in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model. Under
assumptions which guarantee downward sloping Cournot response functions, Bertrand-Edgworth
capacity functions can exhibit increases as well as decreases in the best-response as k, increases.
Besides the upward jump that takas place in Type 2 and 3 reaction functions, R"(k,) slopes upward
if c,~cEfr. For certain cost combination the Bertrand-Edgeworth best-response first slopes
downward along R`(k,), then slopes upward along RM(k,) until it finally jumps downward to ~.14









Figure 3: Bertrand-F,dgeworth capacity best-responsejunctions.15
5. EQUILIBRIUM W'ITH NEGLIG[BLE COST OF CAPACITY
In this section the 3-stage equilibrium will be derived when the'unit cost of capacity is
negligible, r-0'. The purpose ofthis assumption, in place of zero cost, is meant to focus attention
on the issue of strategic capacity setting, without the complications involved with positive unit cost
of capacity. "Negligible" is interpreted as positive, but infinitesimally small such that it may be
ignored in the profit calculations. Alternatively, lower capacities could simply be assumed to be
lexicographically preferred in situations of identical profits. Negligible capacity cost provides an
intuitive means of selecting an equilibrium in situations when various capacities yield identical
payoffs.
The equilibrium is quite simple to determine with negligible cost of capacity.
Proposition4: The incumbent chooses its equilibrium capacity so as to minimizes the entrant's best-
capacity response in the 3-stage game with negligible cost of capacity.
Proot: First, it is obvious that (in the relevant cost ranges) the incumbent will never choose
capacities greater than k;. The incumbent would earn a zero profit in the subgame which could be
earned by simply setting a zero capacity. Thus, the incumbent's optimal capacity lies in the range
of capacities along R`(k,) or R"(k,). The incumbent's choice along R`(k,) is the same as that in a
quantity setting game. Since, with negligible cost of capacity, the Stackelberg point lies outside K`,
the incumbent prefers the highest possible capacity along R`(k,) (the lowest capacity response of the
entrant). If k; sko, the incumbent sets k; as its equilibrium capacity and the entrant responds with
R`(k~,), its lowest response with a Type 3 response function. If k;' ~ ko, the incumbent's most
prefered capacity along R`(k,) is ko. In the region K`'" the incumbent earns L,(~,)-H,(p"), the
equivalent of the profit of a monopolist faced with the residual demand. (p"), the equivalent of the16
profit of a monopolist faced with the residual demand. The incumbent maximizes residual demand
by minimizing the rival firm's capacity. In other words, the point along RM(k,) associated with the
lowest capacity response. Depending on which is lower, ~, or kÉ, the incumbent prefers k; or ko. ~
Three types of equilibria are identified in Proposition 4. In the first type the incumbent sets
k' and the entrant seu 1,E. This type of equilibrium occurs whenever the reaction function is of Type
1 and ~E c kÉ. When the reaction function is of Type 1 and ~E ~kE, or of Type 2, the incumbent's
equilibrium capacity is k;-k~, the entrant's k~-kÉ. Finally, if the reaction function is of Type 3
the equilibrium is k;-k;, k~-RÉ(k;). The relation between these three types of equilibria and the










Figure 4: Relation between firms' unit costs oj production up to capaciry and the rype of
equi[ibrium outcome when the unit cost of capacity is negligible.17
The first two types of outcomes have been observed in previous models of incumbency.
The entrant's equilibrium capacity in the first type of outcome, ~E, is identical to Gelman and
Salop's judo capacity; the entrant chooses its capacity in order to passify a stronger (larger, more
efficient) in~umbent. Although Gelman and Salop's assumption on the timing of pricing decisíons
is sequential rather than simultaneaus, the entrant's capacity responses are identical within this
capacity region.' The 3-stage game is simply a simultaneous pricing version of Gelman and Salop's
model with the addition of endogenous incumbent capacity. If capacity is costless, Gelman and
Salop's exogenous infinite capacity incumbent is one of a continuum of equilibria where the entrant
sets ~E and the incumbent sets any capacity k; Zk;. The determining characteristic in the region of
capacities where ~E lies is that the incumbent's capacity is so large that the entrant faces a zero
residual demand at all prices above its unit cost of production. An interesting addition to Gelman
and Salop's intuition on the use of judo strategies by a less efficient entrant is that incumbency y
advantages can outweigh cost advantages. When the cost advantage is relatively small the slightly
more efficient entrant faced with a large less efficient incumbent prefers setting a judo capacity in
order to passify later price competition (i.e accomodation) rather then setting capacity sufficient to
induce the asymmetric cost Bertrand outcome (i.e undercutting). This occurs in the 3-stage model
when the costs satisfy II~E,k',)zIIE(Q(c,),k;) and J~EckÉ.
The second type of outcome coincides with Dixit's ( 1980) outcome. With a zero cost of
capacity, sequential capacity choice followed by simultaneous pricing yields the Cournot outcome,
as occurs in Dixit's model as well. The implication of this result is that it is important to distinguish
between cost precommitment and capacity precommitment. The ability to precommit capacity is not
sufficient to obtain a first mover advantage in Dixit's model. The advantage lies with the ability to
sink costs first. In the third type of outcome, the roles of the incumbent and entrant are reversed
from those in Gelman and Salop's model. The incumbent restrains its capacity in order to passify
a more efficient entrant, a reverse judo equilibrium.18
Unlike Kreps and Scheinkman's simultaneous capacity setting result, the sequential quantity
setting model cannot be interpreted as reduced form of the equivalent Bertrand-Edgeworth price
setting model when costs are negligible. This is easily established from the fact that the Stackelberg
point lies outside the region K~. This is not always the case when capacity is costly.
6. EQUILIBRIUM WITH POSITIVE COST OF CAPACITY
The previous section examined the 3-stage model under the assumption of a negligible cost
of capacity. Increasing the identical, unit cost of capacity leads to several interesting results.
Equilibria which are characterized by non~iegenerate mixed strategy pricing eventually disappear.
Equilibrium capacities do not necessarily decline as their cost inereases. And, above some level of




Figure 5: Path of the equilibrium capacities forfirms with identical costs ofproduction as the
unit cost of capaciry increases.19
All three of these phenomenon are observed in the case of symmetric unit costs of
production. Figure 5 shows the path of the equilibrium capacities as the cost of capacity inereases
for the case of symmetric unit costs of production, c,-0, i-1,2. If the cost of capacity is relatively
small a judo type equilibrium occurs where pricing is in non-degenerate mixed strategies. Both firms
hold excess capacity on average. That is, expected sales are less than capacity. Additionally, both
the incumbent's capacity and expected price are greater than the entrant's in equilibrium, implying
that the incumbent's excess capacity is greater than the entrant in expectation. After the cost of
capacity reaches a critical value, the strategic benefit of holding such a large capacity is offset by
the cost. At this point the incumbent's equilibrium capacity jumps to a lower value and the entrant's
capacity jumps to higher value. Here a second range of Dixit type equilibria begins. As the cost
of capacity increases, ko increases. Further increase in r lead to the Stackelberg point eventually
moving inside K`. In this highest range of r the outcome of the sequential capacity Bertrand-
Edgeworth model is identical to tha Stackelberg model.9 Capacity cost increases affect the 3-stage
equilibrium just as they would a Stackelberg equilibrium, both equilibrium capacities decline and
price increases. Figure 6 shows the expected prices for firms with identical costs of production in
these three ranges of capacity cost.
A positive relation between r and k; also exists when k;-k;'. This is easily seen from the
fact that k; must be increasing in r, because the cost of setting Q(a~ becomes much more expensive
in relation to R~(k,) and R"'(k,).'o Given that the k; is decreasing in r, there is some level of r at
which k; exceeds the incumbent's Stackelberg level. When this happens the Stackelherg outcome
is ohtained in the 3-stage model. The incumbent's equilibrium capacity increases with increases in
r as long as k; is less than the incumbent's Stackelberg capacity.20
Judo Dizit Staclcelbag r
Figure 6: Relation between the unit cost of capacity and the equilibrium expected prices offirms
with identical unit costs of production.
Regardless of the difference in the production costs, or the order ofcapacity choice between
low-cost and high-cost tirms, the entire non-zero portion of the best-response function lies inside K~
for some value of r, and the outcome of the 3-stage game must coincide with the Stackelberg
equilibrium. Nece.esary and sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the two models are given in
the tollowing proposition:
PropositionS: The outcome of the 3-stage sequential capacitylsimultaneous pricing model is identical
to that of the Stackelberg model if and only if r is large enough to satisfy the following three
mnditions:i). 1-k-' -c;
r z p(c~,c~.min{ie[0,1]~k;'S 2 , i,j-1,2}
where k' is firm i's equilibrium capacity.
1.cE-2c~ 1 tc,-2ce
r z min{ , }
5 2
r ~ max{lOc,-3cE-7y max{0,(1-c~)(3-Sc,t2c~} , 0}.
Proof: Follows from preceding discussion. O
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The first condition is merely that the cost of capacity must be high enough to generate equilibrium
capacities inside K`. The second condition states that the cost of capacity must be high enough so
that the Stackelberg capacity levels are inside K`. The final condition is actually only relevant (i.e.
the right side is non-tero) when the high-cost firm leads and the cost difference is relatively large.
It states that the cost of capacity must be high enough so that k;, the capacity level at which the
luw-cost entrant is indifferent between undercutting and accommodating the high-cost incumbent,
is at least as large as the incumbent's Stackelberg capacity level.
Figures 7a and 7b illustrate the various types of equilibria in relation to the unit cost of
capacity and the higher cost of production (the lower production cost is set to zero), when the less
efficient and more efficient firm leads, respectively. The equilibria fall into four basic regions, one
of which is where they coincide with Stackelberg. In Region I, reverse judo equilibria are found.
Region Ib contains cases where the Stackelberg point lies inside K`, but k;` 5 k;; the strategy of
capacity expansion and price undercutting dominates the Stackelberg response. Equilibrium
capacities in Region II are Dixit type equílibria. Hére, as in Region I, equilibrium prices are in pure
strategies and clear all capacity from the market. In both Regions I and II the equilibrium capacity
of the incumbent increases when r increases. In Regions III equilibrium prices are in non-degenerate
mixed strategies. Two interesting subcases exists. In Region IIIb the Stackelberg point lies within
K`, but the equilibria are of judo type. Equilibria in Region IIIc exhibit positive profit for the less22
efficient firm in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, while the Stackelberg model predicts the more
efficient firm would be a monopolist. Finally, the outcomes of these two models coincide in Region
IV.
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Figure 7: Relation between the type of equilihrium outcome, the unit cost of capaciry and the
size of the less efficient frrm's cost disadvantage.
[n the case of industries that are characterized by costly capital requirements, the analysis
of this section supports the use of the Stackelberg model as a reduced form for the more complex
3-stage model. For large (identical and constant) unit costs of capacity the outcomes of the two
models coincide. However, although it may appear that the minimum cost of capacity required to
ohtain the Stackelberg outcome is quite low, the calculation of the breakdown of costs into capacity
and (variable) production components must be done with care. One usually thinks of price
competition as an ongoing process, whereas investment in capacity occurs at discrete (and usually
distant) periods in time. If we try to capture this view of industry by changing the 3-stage model to
one of sequential capacity choice followed by n periods of simultaneous price setting, (for simplicity23
assuming no discounting) profits for firm i in the (finite horizon) game would be
n a,(k,-,k,) - r k; (4)
where ~r; represents the expected profits of firm i in each period of price setting, given the initial
levels of capacity chosen. Dividing each firm's payoff function by the constant n we obtain the same
payoff function as the 3-stage game examined in this section, but with a cost of capacity rln. Thus,
with several periods of price competition the effective cost of capacity is lowered."
The point of this short digression is that whether capacity costs in most industries are
sufficient to guarantee that the Stackelberg outcome occurs is not at all apparent. While the
persistence of ezcess capacity which is observed in some industries may have many sources, the
phenomenon is consistent with the 3-stage model for parameters which result in non-degenerate
mixed strategy pricing. The 3-stage model exhibits a strategic value to excess capacity even when
entry deterrence is not an issue. If one believes that sequential capacity setting is a relevant
phenomenon, the resulu in this section point to the importance of the breakdown of eosts between
sunk costs of capacity and variable costs of production.'Z The distinction between high and low
sunk cost industries, which plays no role in the Kreps- Scheinkman analysis with identical cosu
of production up to capacity, leads to quite different empirical predictions with sequential capacity
setting. Incorporating these differences into empirical and policy research that has been based on
quantity setting models appears a fruitful direction for future research.24
7. CONCLUS[ONS
The sequentia! capacity setting, Bertrand-Edgeworth model unifies several previous models
of incumbency. Depending on the difference in unit costs of production and the unit cost of
capacity, an outcome similar to one of the following is found: quantity leadership (Stackelberg,
1934), cost precommitment (Dixit, 1980) or judo (Gelman and Salop, 1983).
Two factors appear important to the credible establishment of a first mover advantage. The
first is the relation between timing and cost. The second is the degree to which production is limited
in the short-run. The distinction between between cost precommitment and capacity precommitment
is important. Either a portion of costs must be unrecoverable (i.e. sunk) prior to entrants
capacitylproduction decisions or productive capacity must be inflexible. If not, commitments are
not credible and a market is contestable.
The 3-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth model permits a simultaneous examination of both points,
while only the first point is observed in quantity setting models. The limitation of production has
no influence on the outcome of the quantity setting model under standard conditions (downward
sloping reaction functions). Cournot's auctioneer eliminates the strategic value of capacity that is
left idle ex-post. Production and capacity become one and the same decision. This is not always
the case when competition is freed from Cournot's assumption that prices must be identical. More
specifically, by setting a large capacity an incumbent provides a credible threat that competition will
be fierce unless an entrant takes it upon itself to limit the intensity by credibily commiting to a small
capacity. Conversely, by an entrant's commitment to a small capacity, the threat need not be carried
out, resulting in excess capacity. On the other hand, entrants may or may not prefer intense price
competition, dependent on thier relative productive efficiency to incumbents'. Large capacities are
less likey to advantage incumbents faced with more efficient entrants. The implication is that less
excess capacity should be observed in situations where entrants are more efficient. Generally, more25
efficient firms choose more aggresive capacity setting strategies.
The strategíc value of capacity has to be balanced against its cost. The cost of capacity is
the value lost if it is put into and then removeà from service, its sunk cost. As the cost of capacity
rises, excess capacity becomes less attractive. For high enougó costs capacity clearing (Cournot
type) pricing should be observed.26
ENDNOTES
1. Both of these papers include assumptions which guarantee the Cournot outcome is unique.
Osborne and Pitchik (1986) have shown that, when the Cournot outcome is not unique, not
every Cournot outcome can be obtained as an equilibrium of the two stage game. Davidson and
Deneckere (1986) show that the equivalence of the two stage game and the Cournot outcome
is sensitive to the rationing assumption.
2. By convention, firm i's minimaz price will be taken to be equal to c; whenever k~ is large
enough that d;(p)-0 for all pZC;.
3. In addition, there is a infinite number of payoff-equivalent equilibria in mixed strategies when
cl ~ c, where firm 2 sets minute enough amounts of probability above c, in such a manner that
firm 1 still prefers setting c, with a probability of one.
4. Althouth the follower's profit is not differentiable along the boundary between Kw and Ka, it
is continuous.
5. R"(k,) equals zero whenever rz(1-2c,fcE)l2.
6. yG; corresponds to the capacty where L;(p) is just capacity constrained at y. Once k, exceedps
~; the L,(p) is non-capcaity constrained at ~;. Any further increases in capacity have no further
effect on ~, and, therefore no effect on L;(-s,). When ~,-~s~, any further increase in k, has no
affect on firms' profits.
7. The capacity k', is defined implicitly by the isoprofit curve which is just tangent to 1G,. The
entrant's profit is decreasing in the leader's capaeity along(2(1-c,)- (1-c;)'-12k,(c,-cE-r) )l3.
If k,~ k; the entrant's profit along (2(1-c,)- (1-c;)~-12k,(c,-cE-r) )~3 is lower than II~{k;,~E).
Points along (2(1-c,)- ( I-c;)--12k,(c,-cE-r) )l3 where k, c k; result in higher profit and thus
are better responses than ~E. It follows that RM must jump downward from the facts that ,~,
intersects (2(1-c,)- ( I -c;)--12k,(c,-cE-r) )l3 and that the follower's isoprofit curves are
concave in kE for all k,s,~,.
8. Gelman and Salop make the ad hoc assumption that the that the less efficient entrant sets price
first. While this framework strengthens Gelman and Salop's results by further disadvantaging
the entrant, Deneckere and Kovenock (1988) have shown that the larger, more efficient
incumbent would set price first in a model of endogenous price leadership.
9. Tirole (1988, p.319) describes the coincidence of the 3-stage model with Stackelberg's model
for one point on this path, the one corresponding to a(rescaled) cost of capacity of 0.75. This
cost is just sufficient to guarantee that the entire positive portion of the best-response function
lies inside K`.
10. kZ equals 1-c,-r-2 (1-cE)(cE-c,-r) , if cE~c,fr and c,s(ScÉ1)4, or ( 1-cE)2I16(cE-c,-r) if
CEiC,fr and C,i(SCÈ I}4. Otherwise, kZ' is undefined.11. It is clear that the effective cost of capacity will lie between r and rln with positive discounting
of profits earned atter capacities are set.
12. Sunk cost can be attributed to many factors other than capacity; such as entry fees or those
associated with identifying and familiarizing oneself with marlcets, such as RBcD or advertising.
However, these types of sunk costs enter into the capacity decision in a fundamentally different
way than a unit cost of capacity; essentially as a lump-sum fixed-cost.28
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